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The Great Captains
of Chaos:
Developing Adaptive Leaders
Major F. John Burpo, U.S. Army

The maximum use of force is in no way incompatible
with the simultaneous use of intellect.
—Carl von Clausewitz1

A

S A JUNIOR staff captain, I observed an officer
record brief (ORB) scrub of the majors inbound
to my unit. The brigade personnel officer (S1) sorted
the ORBs first into U.S. Command and General Staff
Officer Course (CGSOC) resident and nonresident
graduates. The brigade executive officer (XO) then
wanted to know which resident CGSOC graduates
had served as observer/controllers (O/Cs) at the
National Training Center.
The S1 dutifully read the background of each
officer. As he did so, he came across one I thought
was quite promising—an officer who had light,
airborne, and heavy experience and a master’s
degree in Arabic studies from an Ivy League school.
The XO, however, directed the S1 to “[s]end that
[expletive] back to corps. We don’t need any smart
guys down here.” Surely, the unit did not need an
Arabic-speaking foreign area officer with tactical
experience across the heavy-light spectrum!While
this was admittedly a singular event, the story
resonates throughout the officer assignment and
selection system and is reinforced by the actions
of many senior mentors.
After serving two commands, I was considering
studying biochemical engineering and teaching
at West Point, but I was continually berated by
my senior rater: “You’re [expletive]-up, ranger!”
Serving as a combat training center O/C was
the recommendation du jour in order to remain
competitive for battalion command. However,
this singular partiality to tactical assignments
and developmental experiences is disconnected
from the operational environment’s demands and
the increasing requirements for adaptive leaders.
U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 1, The Army,
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asserts: “The ambiguous nature of the operational
environment requires Army leaders who are selfaware and adaptive.”2
In this article, therefore, I want to further refine
the Army’s definition of adaptive leadership and
recommend specific courses of action to develop
adaptive leaders. Doing so requires an analysis of
current leadership-development programs and the
operating environment. While my focus is on the
officer corps, this analysis could also serve to enhance
the developmental models used for noncommissioned
officers and junior enlisted soldiers. Ultimately, the
operating environment demands leaders who are
comfortable with the technologically insurmountable
ambiguity that chaos theory defines and which
current Army leadership programs fail to directly
address. To further develop adaptive leaders and
to attract people who have enhanced skills such
as technical knowledge, language proficiency, and
regional area expertise, the Army must align leaderdevelopment programs with the demands of the
operating environment.

The Operating Environment

We are shaping the world faster than we can
change ourselves, and we are applying to the present
the habits of the past.—Winston Churchill3
Lieutenant General Frederic J. Brown says that
“[g]enuinely new leadership requirements have
arisen since the events of 9/11. . . . National Security
Strategy now identifies preemption, recovery of
failed states, and Homeland Security as major
military missions. Each new mission, alone and
in combination, places new joint, interagency,
intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM)
responsibilities squarely on the plates of Army
leaders at every grade.”4
Clearly the bipolar world of fighting conventional
enemy orders of battle exclusively is past. The new
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operating environment requires Army leaders to a more rapid observation, orientation, decision,
be more familiar with the JIIM framework and the action (OODA) loop cycle.10 Today, senior leaders
world at large. The complexity of areas of operations continually seek to develop technological substitutes
(particularly in military operations in urban terrain) for Napoleon’s hilltop, which are panaceas to clear
further compounds the challenges the increased the fog of war. Supposedly, technological information
number of actors impose. Accordingly, FM 3-0, superiority then facilitates the prediction of enemy
Operations, states: “Adaptability is critical to urban courses of action.11
stability operations and support operations because
The problem is, however, that while certainly
these operations relentlessly present complex desirable, dispensing with the unpredictable nature
challenges to commanders for which no prescribed of war is consistent with neither common sense nor
solutions exist.” 5 As warfare and technology mathematical probability. Warfare is not subject
rapidly evolve, doctrine will lag behind the need to a simple linear relationship of output effects
for ready solutions, and Army officers will confront proportional to the input of combat force. A number
many situations outside the doctrinal framework. of variables define war—troop strength, supply rates,
The consequent demand for adaptability further morale, enemy psychology, terrain, and weather—
necessitates that “[c]ultural and demographic factors and almost all have nonlinear effects and maintain
that transcend borders make conﬂict resolution a an interrelationship with many other variables. The
complicated and lengthy process, often requiring nonlinearity of the defining variables describes a
several changes in the nature of an operation before chaotic system, and “[c]haotic systems never repeat
exactly because their future behavior is extremely
an end state can be achieved.”6
This emergent contemporary operating sensitive to initial conditions.”12 Quantifying abstract
environment (COE) places Army core compe- but inﬂuential variables such as enemy psychology
and friendly morale
tencies and combat
presents immediate
operations as a
subset of more
problems, not the
Organizational and Operational (O&O) Concept deﬁnes
general problem
least of which is
an adaptive leader as “[a] leader who can inﬂuence
solving across the
resolving initial syspeople—by providing purpose, direction, and motivation—
diplomatic, infortem values to any
while operating in a complex, dynamic environment of
significance.
mational, military,
uncertainty and ambiguity to accomplish the mission and
The implication
and economic
improve the organization.”
for predicting enemy
(DIME) spectrum
with which Army
actions to disable his
leaders at all levels
OODA loop is that
must be conversant and prepared to control. 7 no matter how effective the model, unpredictability
Whether the COE progresses toward machine-versus- will always exist. Uncertainty is the only constant
machine, high-tech cyber-warfare; people-networked of warfare. Author Leonard Wong quotes an officer
fourth-generation warfare; or some intermediate from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF): “We don’t
form of warfare, the minds of Great Captains will know whether we are going to get rocks thrown at
be ascendant as the most critical and powerful tools us, or mortars, or a handshake, or a cup of tea. It
for conducting warfare.8 These minds will serve as really doesn’t depend on what neighborhood we are
the driving force in the conduct of warfare, as well going to. It doesn’t matter what we are going to do.
as in future revolutions in military affairs, which The level of hostility is something that we cannot
historically are driven by conceptual, doctrinal, and predict.”13
intellectual forces, not technology.9
No amount of technology can offset the effects of
The term Great Captain conjures images of chaos theory, despite that theory’s ability to set the
Napoleon masterfully orchestrating a battle from boundaries of high probability. Williamson Murray
a commanding hilltop. His view of both friendly says: “Precisely because we Americans have a long
and enemy situations offers perfect situational track record of overestimating our technological
awareness in real time, enhancing the faculties of superiority and underestimating the ability of our
intuition and emboldening the speed of decision. opponents to short circuit our advantages . . . we
In modern parlance, this idealized Napoleon cannot afford to indulge [in this form of hubris]
possessed information superiority and could achieve again.”14 Robert B. Brown further asserts that one
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primary reason for this is that “[t]echnology is readily
• Being comfortable with uncertainty (agile and
available to our enemies, and they will use it to exploit ﬂexible).
weaknesses.”15 The question then is, How can we
• Being a focused, quick learner.
define and develop Great Captains who can adaptively
• Empowering and decentralizing leadership,
plan and execute in the midst of chaos?
allowing for initiative within intent.
• Being a good communicator.
Deﬁning Adaptive Leadership
• Building cohesive, trusting teams with candor.
One of the serious problems in planning the fight
• Using force across the full spectrum of conﬂict.20
against American doctrine is that the Americans do
Because FM 22-100 does not give a definition of
not read their manuals, nor do they feel any obligation adaptive leadership, the IBCT O&O plan definition
to follow their doctrine.—From a Soviet Junior and character trait list are taken together as a starting
Lieutenant’s Notebook16
definition. While this definition addresses the
The U.S. Army has a great history of innovation, requirement to operate in an ambiguous environment,
from the use of irregular tactics during the American it does not specify how an adaptive leader is to do this,
Revolutionary War to improvised vehicle armor in nor does it distinguish adaptive-leader characteristics
Operation Iraqi Freedom. Continuing in this tradition from the general leadership characteristics FM 22-100
and recognizing its value, the Honorable Louis Caldera describes. The definition ultimately fails to convey the
stated: “We are working on producing leaders for essence of the term adaptive, which entails adjusting
change, not just leaders who are doctrinally capable “to a specified use or situation [and to] make fit for, or
and competent leaders for warfighting, but leaders change to suit a new purpose.”21 Consequently, without
also for all kinds of missions with the capability to a concrete characterization of adaptive leadership,
deal with an evolving global situation in which the crafting and evaluating an effective leadershiparray of threats faced
development program
goes across the entire
is not feasible.
spectrum.”17
Before offering a
Clearly there is a need to quickly learn knowledge/skill
Field Manual
definition of
refined
sets coupled with a new operating frame of reference
22-100, Army
adaptive
leadership
that might be radically different from the skills, knowledge,
Leadership, makes
that
better
captures
and perspectives developed through training.
numerous references
the essence of
to the need to adapt as
adaptation in order
a leader: “You must
to form effective
adapt and improvise”;
leader-development programs, it is worth-while
“no exact blue print will exist for success in every to examine Wong’s leadership findings from OIF
context; leadership and the ability to adapt to the based on interviews with junior officers. He reports
situation will carry the day”; “adapt to and handle that “[i]n addition to the mental agility needed to
fluid environments”; “envision, adapt, and lead take on additional duties or to shift roles constantly,
change.”18 What Army leadership doctrine does many junior leaders in OIF described the need to
not offer is a definition of adaptive leadership; it adapt by functioning outside their combat specialty.
offers only random imperatives of the importance Field artillerymen, engineers, and tankers spoke of
to adapt.
operating as infantrymen as they conducted raids
Recognizing the need for a new type of leadership or cordon and searches.”22 Clearly there is a need
(and perhaps recognizing the inadequacy of FM to quickly learn knowledge/skill sets coupled with
22-100), the Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) a new operating frame of reference that might be
Organizational and Operational (O&O) Concept radically different from the skills, knowledge, and
defines an adaptive leader as “[a] leader who perspectives developed through training. Through an
can influence people—by providing purpose, analogy, Wong offers insights on adaptive leadership
direction, and motivation—while operating in a and innovation: “To use a culinary example, cooks
complex, dynamic environment of uncertainty and are quite adept at carrying out a recipe. While there
ambiguity to accomplish the mission and improve the is a small degree of artistic license that goes into
organization.”19 The following list further refines the preparing a meal, the recipe drives the action—not the
definition of adaptive leader traits:
cook. Chefs, on the other hand, look at the ingredients
• Being decisive.
available to them and create a meal. The success of
• Balancing human leadership dimensions with the meal comes from the creativity of the chef—not
technology.
the recipe.”23

66

January-February 2006 • Military review

DOD

MacARTHUR AWARDS

Washington crossing the Delaware (Emanuel Gottlieb Leutze, 1851).

Wong goes on to state that “[i]nnovation and
creativity imply the introduction of new methods,
ideas, or techniques. Innovation cannot be taught in
an 8-hour block of instruction. It cannot be learned
over the Internet. Innovation develops when an
officer is given a minimal number of parameters
(task, condition, and standard) and the requisite time
to plan and execute the training.”24
Clearly there is an indication that creativity,
imagination, and innovation forge the ability to
manipulate ideas and the environment to achieve
some desired effect: Adaptation is more than simply
being “comfortable with uncertainty” akin to a
chameleon simply blending with its surroundings.
Rather, leader adaptation assumes a much more
interactive form of change.
Another idea the IBCT adaptive leader definition
just misses is team building. For an adaptive leader,
simply building a “cohesive, trusting team with
candor” is insufficient. The team itself must take on
adaptation characteristics that network more than
just the leader’s innovative ideas.25 This approach
is more in line with the IBCT premise of “initiative
within intent.”
Given these ideas, an adaptive leader should be
able to quickly identify an operating environment’s
defining variables and creatively leverage all
resources across the DIME. Further, an adaptive
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leader cultivates teams that individually and
collectively innovate and display initiative within
intent. Leadership traits that distinguish an adaptive
leader from those traits that FM 22-100 describes
include—
• Maintaining a problem-solving mindset at the
fore.
• Pursuing lifelong learning; understanding that
adaptation is not a singular event, but a continuing
process both operationally and at home station.
• Possessing the requisite intelligence to analyze
an operating environment and determine the defining
variables and their interrelationships.
• Possessing the imagination and creativity to
innovate within and manipulate the resources of the
operating environment to achieve desired end-state
effects.
• Fostering teams that innovate individually and
collectively.
• Displaying initiative within intent individually
and communicating intent to subordinates to enable
them to do the same.26
With this definition of adaptive leadership, which
more clearly identifies the characteristics that foster
change in an operating environment, the question is,
Is the Army developing adaptive leaders, and if not,
how can the current development system be refined
to do so?
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officer education system to identify and produce the
adaptive leaders the operating environment requires.
A slave to its training and traditions, our army has At the risk of offering a single data point, CGSOC
not succeeded in adapting itself to a form of warfare the currently uses a frontal-attack scenario in ﬂat, open
terrain to demonstrate the unique capabilities of a
military schools do not teach.—Roger Trinquier27
To avoid the same errors that French forces transformed division organization relative to a legacy
committed in their Algerian colony and the errors of division. The use of contiguous, linear operations
the American experience in Vietnam, Lebanon, and is well within the comfort zone of both the faculty
Somalia, the U.S. Army must seriously contemplate and students and reveals an institutional reluctance
whether its leader-development system adequately to adapt to contemporary and future operational
identifies and prepares the adaptive leaders an environments.
operating environment requires. The current
Almost unnoticed is the discontinuation of
institutional struggle to develop adaptive leaders lies assignment policies that actually fostered adaptive
in the military’s strong tradition of applying ordered leaders. First, the Army’s culture of frequently
systems to disordered problems and of desiring moving Soldiers between assignments every few
adaptive minds within an organizational culture of years engenders the basic skills of adapting to new
conformity. The prevailing notion that commanders geographic locations, people, and organizations.
will always have at their disposal a ready source Moreover, to achieve success, alternating heavy and
of “smart guys and gals” to do the “50-pound light assignments forced officers to demonstrate the
headwork” exacerbates this challenge. If every characteristics of adaptive leaders. Post stabilization
officer maintained this rationale for not seeking self- and assignment by skill set (that is, light-light and
development, the effort to develop adaptive leaders heavy-heavy) minimizes this built-in adaptive
would quickly degenerate
environment. Without
dramatically altering
into a Ponzi scheme.
Is the Army developing adaptive leaders,and if
In the Army’s leaderassignment and promotion
not, how can the current development system
development framework,
time lines, how does the
be reﬁned to do so?
institutional training,
Army develop leaderoperational assignments,
development programs
and self-development
to produce the future
form the pillars building up from values and Great Captains who will manage the chaos of the
ethics, expectations and standards, and training and operational environment?
education to produce a trained and ready leader.28
Has this system historically produced adaptive Proposed Changes to Leader
leaders with problem-solving skills that transcend Development
the boundaries of doctrine? It might be argued—based
Change before you have to.—Jack Welch30
on operational struggles with insurgency warfare and
Fortunately, many thinkers have already identified
stability operations and support operations over the the need for adaptive leadership in the Army and
past four decades—that the Army is not producing recommended how these leaders should be trained.
the quantity or required type of adaptive leaders. Unfortunately, many recommendations do not identify
Wong notes: “Unfortunately, behind the seemingly
specific programmatic changes to the Army Training
ubiquitous consensus on both the importance of
and Leader Development system. For instance, analysis
the human dimension in the future and the need for
transforming it, a serious disconnect remains between of adaptive leadership in the Interim Brigade Combat
current leader-development practices and the type Team led to the recommendation that “[t]he Army’s
of leaders the future force requires. Put bluntly, the commission-producing institutions must initiate an
Army is relying on a leader-development system that adaptive-learning continuum that instills an openencourages reactive instead of proactive thought, minded and curious approach to a leader’s duties.
compliance instead of creativity, and adherence Officers’basic and advanced courses, together with [the]
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and
instead of audacity.”29
Despite dedicating unparalleled financial and the U.S.Army War College, must provide the necessary
time resources to develop individuals within its follow-on steps to ensure successive approximations
organization, theArmy has failed to quickly morph its of the desired end state (adaptive leaders).”31

The Current Approach to Leader
Development
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The recommendation is too abstract to be While the list is weighted toward advanced civilian
“actionable” and characterizes a number of other education, this course offers significant intellectual
recommendations on the development of adaptive challenge, especially for officers far removed from
leaders.32 To bridge the abstract, if not abstruse, the classroom. Any discussion that ensues from
goals for adaptive leadership to programs that might these recommendations is a positive step toward
serve to identify and further develop these leaders, generating more concrete experiences. The desired
I offer the following:
end state is the development of adaptive leaders
• Establish language proficiency pay for prepared for the unpredictability of chaos. Because
language skills for all officers regardless of whether it is not possible to prepare every officer for every
they fill a language-specific position. Pay can be type of assignment and possible deployment,
offered based on the supply and demand of specific the Army should seek to develop the minds and
leadership dynamics of its future Great Captains.
languages.
• Establish proficiency pay for officers
completing graduate degrees on their own time in Leading Great Captains Into the
geographic areas, history, and technical skills, and Future
Wong says: “Our equation is filled with variables
assign specific skill identifiers to graduate degrees.
that
constantly change: the weather, people,
Pay can be offered based on the specific supply and
different dynamics that we have no control over.
demand needs of the Army.
• Increase the number of Ranger school If we tried to control them, we would be breaking
the rules. It is important that we understand our
allocations.
• Offer an Intermediate Level Education constraints, understand our limitations, understand
the variables that are
validation examination
out there, and then learn
enabling officers to
how to deal with [them].
The Interim Brigade Combat Team led to the
bypass CGSOC and
recommendation
that
“[t]he
Army’s
commissionThere are certain things
immediately enter the
producing
institutions
must
initiate
an
adaptivethat you are not going to
School for Advanced
learning continuum that instills an open-minded
be able to control[:] the
Military Studies or a
and curious approach to a leader’s duties.
emotions your soldiers
civilian advanced degree
run into, the problems
program.
your soldiers have at
• Substitute civilian
advanced degree, sister service, or foreign military home, the complex situation between the Shiites
exchange programs for one military school for up to and Sunnis, the cultural barrier, the standoff
50 percent of the officers selected for both CGSOC between Western culture, Christian culture, and
Muslim culture. There are certain things that we
and the Army War College.
• Require advanced-degree civilian education in won’t understand because it is a totally different
the same manner as joint experience for promotion environment. . . . To prepare an officer for this, to
prepare anyone for this, you need to just constantly
to senior ranks.
• Consider a resident civilian advanced-degree test him, put him in challenging situations, and
allow [him] to sort of think and act under pressure
program as a year of branch qualification.
• Develop a comprehensive professional and stress.”33
Accepting the unpredictability of the operating
certification examination at the conclusion of
CGSOC similar to the professional engineer exam environment, identifying the variables that define
environments, and continually developing adaptive
or lawyer bar exam.
• Reverse the trend of increasingly privatizing leaders in demanding situations is the path to
staff and faculty at military schools and, instead, creating adaptive leaders. The Army must find
select successful company, battalion, and brigade ways to identify and further develop future Great
Captains who will be able to adapt and successfully
commanders for teaching assignments.
Each recommendation is designed to help officers defeat chaos. These recommendations are a first step
adapt to social, organizational, and intellectual toward driving the conversation away from abstract
environments uniquely different from the Army’s. desires and toward practical programs.MR
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